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Dallas, Texas 
The Burdens of Prosperity
Robert McPherson
University of Texas
In fiscal year 1980, the City of Dallas will spend a little 
over $10 million in CETA funds providing training, public 
service employment and related services for eligible clients 
living within its corporate boundaries. Because of the 1978 
CETA amendments and the city's own interest in targeting 
on those most in need, program resources are focused on the 
low-income unemployed; however, this emphasis is not 
matched by an appropriate mix of training and related ser 
vices to equip the clients to compete effectively for the 
semiskilled and skilled jobs available in the area's labor 
market. Though Dallas enjoys an environment free of many 
of the familiar institutional constraints affecting CETA pro 
grams in most urban settings, it operates a program not 
significantly different from that of other cities with much 
less favorable conditions. Rather than providing long term 
quality training programs to develop the knowledge and 
skills of the hard-core unemployed the city serves, it con 
tinues to fund short term, low-cost training programs to 
serve as many individuals as possible. Why has Dallas not 
used its flexibilities under CETA to develop a training pro 
gram that's more beneficial to their clients and to employers 
in the community?
The Local Environment
City government in Dallas is a textbook example of the 
strong manager-council model. The mayor and members of 
the city council are the elected representatives responsible for 
making the policy decisions; however, the city manager, as
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the chief executive officer, runs the city. He is in the pivotal 
role of making recommendations to the council and im 
plementing their decisions. The current manager has been in 
the job nearly eight years and is recognized as one of the 
most powerful figures in city government. Under his leader 
ship the city has gained a national reputation as one of the 
best managed in the country. The council and manager take 
pride in their successful application of private sector 
management practices to city government.
The Dallas Citizen's Council (DCC), an organization com 
prising some of the most wealthy and influential business 
leaders in the country, makes the major policy decisions for 
the city. Its primary objective is creating a local environment 
where the large corporations can prosper and continue to 
grow with a minimum of interference from government. The 
current mayor and a majority of the council members were 
dependent on the DCC for endorsement and financial sup 
port for election and remain responsive to the wishes of the 
special interest group. The underlying values of the leaders in 
the local power structure are apparently very conservative. 
Their economics is laissez-faire, and there is a strong em 
phasis on individual self-sufficiency.
Economic growth in the Dallas area suggests that the city 
fathers may have the right approach. Since the mid-1970s 
recession, real per capita income has grown at about 3 per 
cent a year, when the national economy was stagnating. Over 
the past decade the city's population, currently estimated 
from 865,000 to 900,000, has not expanded as fast as the na 
tional average, but the small cities adjacent to Dallas have 
grown 10 times the city's rate. About 33 percent of the city's 
population is minority, with blacks at 25 percent and 
Hispanics making up about 8 percent of the total.
According to Texas Employment Commission (TEC) 
reports, the Dallas labor force has grown at an annual rate of
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over 5 percent since 1975, and the growth in employment has 
more than kept pace. The unemployment rate for 1978 was 
just over 4 percent; for 1979, only 3.6 percent. Though the 
rate in the summer of 1980 is again over 5 percent, it is not 
expected to stay at the high level.
While these statistics reflect a strong and expanding 
economy, the benefits of growth are not distributed equally. 
According to the city's CETA plan almost 17 percent of the 
city's population are members of families with incomes 
below the poverty level. Over 40 percent of the blacks live in 
poverty. Unemployment rates for minorities are more than 
twice those for whites, and for particular subgroups of the 
unemployed, like youth, the differences are even wider.
Overall, however, the economic picture is bright, and the 
demand for workers remains strong. Labor market informa 
tion from the TEC and the North Central Texas Council of 
Governments identifies shortages over a wide spectrum of 
occupations. In construction, manufacturing, and the ser 
vice industries there are acute shortages in occupations such 
as draftsmen, engineers, bricklayers, machinists, computer 
programmers, electronics technicians, nurses, secretaries, 
and typists. Help-wanted ads in local newspapers also reflect 
a strong demand for unskilled workers for jobs in the secon 
dary labor market.
Local employers aggressively compete for good 
employees: billboards on major highways leading into Dallas 
invite workers to call Texas Instruments for a good job; 
help-wanted posters are displayed in the windows of 
businesses; and major corporations advertise outside the 
area—and sometimes outside the country—to attract 
semiskilled and skilled workers. The general feeling on the 
street, from cab drivers to lawyers, is that anyone wanting to 
work can find a job in Dallas.
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The CETA program in Dallas, especially after the 1978 
amendments, is seen as a federal program with more poten 
tial liabilities than benefits for city government. As a CETA 
prime sponsor the city sees itself responsible for a controver 
sial program fraught with continuing accusations of poor 
management, fraud, and abuse. With private employers ac 
tively recruiting workers, subsidized training and public ser 
vice jobs programs are viewed as competing for the available 
labor supply and therefore contributing, rather than helping 
alleviate, problems in local labor markets. In July 1979 the 
council seriously considered terminating the city's involve 
ment in the program. Apparently, a rash of negative 
publicity—mostly directed at the management practices of 
minority based organizations having CETA contracts with 
the city—was too close for comfort. Only after lengthy 
deliberations where city staff made major commitments to 
improve program management and contractor performance 
did the council defeat a resolution to terminate the city's 
CETA grant from the Department of Labor by a vote of six 
to five.
Over the past year the media and the city council have 
given less attention to the program. City staff have taken 
steps to improve management, and recently hired a public in 
formation officer to create a positive image for CETA. The 
present calm, however, should not be interpreted as any 
groundswell of support from the council for the human 
resources objective of the program.
In this environment the city manager is primarily in 
terested in making sure that CETA funds are efficiently 
managed. Apparently, for the CETA staff in Dallas this 
means developing elaborate systems and procedures for pro 
cessing federal funds through city government to agencies 
under contract to provide services; keeping the manager in 
formed so that he is never surprised; making sure that there 
are no mistakes; and keeping things relatively quiet.
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Program Planning and Operations
Management of the CETA program in Dallas is divided 
between the city and its program deliverers. The city council 
and manager make the major policy and program decisions 
while the Office of Human Development (OHD)—organiza 
tionally a part of the city manager's office—is responsible 
for program planning, contracting, monitoring and evalua 
tion. The city contracts with other public, private, and non 
profit agencies to provide program services.
For fiscal 1980, the city had $19 million available under a 
variety of CETA titles and programs. About $14 million was 
programmed, and of that amount, little more than $10 
million will be spent (table 1).
Almost all of the CETA funded training is in the adult and 
youth components funded under titles II-B and IV. Two ex 
ceptions supported by public service employment resources 
amount to approximately $600,000: a work experience pro 
gram including limited vestibule training—that the city inap 
propriately calls pre-apprenticeship training; and a career 
development program providing job-search training (table 
2).
CETA eligibility criteria, combined with the target groups 
set by OHD planners have definitely focused program 
resources on the low-income unemployed. High school 
dropouts, disabled veterans, public assistance recipients, ex- 
offenders and the handicapped are identified as special 
groups to be served by the city's programs.
The training delivery system is made up of over 20 
organizations funded to provide a wide range of training and 
related services including outreach, intake, referral, basic 
education, training, work experience, support services, job 
placement, and follow-up. Private non-profit agencies—11





Adult employment and training3
Youth employment and training15
Private sector initiatives
Public service employment (title II-D)
































a. Excludes sect. 204 vocational education funds and program activity.




Table 2. Adult and Youth Training Plan Under CETAa, by Activity, Fiscal 
































a. Figures exclude the summer youth employment program and two training programs 
funded from public service employment resources.
b. Figures will not match those on the previous table due to differences between numbers in 
the prime sponsor's plan and those in agency contracts.
of the 20—dominate the system accounting for 54 percent of 
the $4.5 million available for contract services in 1980. Five 
public agencies—other city departments and two school 
districts—receive 36 percent, while four private for-profit 
firms have only 10 percent of the funding.
The city is attempting to centralize some service deliveries. 
Outreach for all CETA funded training programs is provid 
ed by a single agency—the Dallas Urban League (DUL). In 
take, assessment, and referral services for the system are now 
centralized through a contract with the city's Martin Luther 
King Center (MLK). Organizations such as Operation SER, 
Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), and Dallas In 
dependent School District's (DISD) skills center provide 
classroom training, job development and placement services, 
serve as additional intake and referral centers and conduct 
30-day followup on all their enrollees. The American GI 
Forum has a contract for longer term followup of par 
ticipants at 3, 6, and 12 months after they leave the program 
(table 3).
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Table 3. Major Service Deliverers3 and Activities Under CETA, Fiscal 
1980: City of Dallas
Delivery agent Funding Activity
Operation SER $589,583
Opportunities Industrialization 516,461 
Center (QIC)
Dallas Housing Authority13 500,000
Dallas Independent School 460,698 
District (skills center)
Martin Luther King Center 414,000
Dallas County Community 300,000 
Action Agency
Basic education 












assessment and referral 
Support services 
Work experience
a. Agencies with service contracts of $300,000 or more.
b. OHD staff call the DHA's program a pre-apprenticeship program; however, it is more 
appropriately classified as a work experience program which includes some vestibule train 
ing.
Three types of training are available for CETA enrollees: 
basic education, vocational training and career development. 
Basic education, career development, and most of the voca 
tional training are provided in a classroom setting with more 
than 75 percent of the participants served by two school 
districts, OIC, Operation SER, and the city's personnel 
department. The other classroom training enrollees are 
spread among six smaller contractors, including the four 
private for-profit firms. For 1980, nine agencies are pro 
viding classroom training in more than 15 occupational areas 
(table 4). The remainder of the vocational training is provid 
ed through on-the-job training with contractors such as the
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National Alliance of Business (NAB) and Goodwill In 
dustries.
Table 4. Classroom Training Under CETA, Fiscal 1980: City of Dallas
Delivery agent
Number to 









City of Dallas 
(personnel department)
Nurse's Aide Academy 
American Trades Institute
Home and Apartment 
Builders Association
Assessment and Assignment 
Unit of Dallas
275 Basic education
400 Bilingual basic education
480 Clerical
Auto mechanics 













140 Bilingual clerical 








a. Figures will not sum to the number shown on table 2 due to the termination of one 
deliverer and difference between the numbers planned by OHD and those in agency con 
tracts.
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Management reports for the third quarter of fiscal year 
1980—the latest cumulative information available—show 
the program operating well below planned expenditures 
(table 5).
Table 5. Actual and Planned Expenditures for CETAa Through the Third 





























a. Excludes prime sponsor administration, centralized services and vocational education 
services funded under sect. 204.
With the exception of public service employment, where 
recent hiring brought enrollments to 97 percent of plan, 
CETA program enrollments reflect the same pattern as ex 
penditures while positive terminations and placement are on 
ly half of those planned. Job placements—at 81 percent of 
the positive terminations—reflect the city's high placement 
goals, the availability of jobs in the area, and unattractive 
options such as going back to school or entering military ser 
vice.
Clients in the city's program are young, relatively 
uneducated and primarily black with the distribution among 
various program components about as expected. Youth pro 
grams serve higher percentages of women and blacks without 
basic education credentials, while public service employment 
serves slightly more white, older and better educated per 
sons. Similarities in the demographic characteristics of par-
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ticipants reflect stricter eligibility requirements in the 1978 
GET A amendments, the city's emphasis on targeting on 
those most in need, and the kinds of people applying for ser 
vices. GET A enrollees in Dallas tend to be people with 
several barriers to employment who cannot hold a job even 
in a tight labor market. They need extensive help to over 
come their cultural, psychological, physical, transportation, 
and child care problems.
For adult and youth training components, expenditures 
and enrollments, though closer to plan, reflect the same pat 
tern as the CETA program as a whole. Classroom and on- 
the-job training are lagging, while the small and often 
maligned work experience program is operating at 97 percent 
of planned expenditures and 90 percent of planned 
enrollments. In contrast, classroom training programs are 
operating with expenditures at 71 percent and enrollments at 
61 percent of those planned for the third quarter. Based on 
this performance, the costs of positive terminations from 
classroom training are averaging over $4,600, and the cost 
per placement is $5,300, much higher than anticipated by the 
city.
While contractors are likely to meet their enrollment goals 
for 1980, they will not achieve their planned numbers of 
positive terminations and placements.
The Quality of Training 
and Related Services
OHD reports provide information on the number of 
enrollees, positive terminations and placements by occupa 
tional training area and on average wage gains and retention 
rates of terminees by training contractor. While all of this 
data is potentially useful for measuring the level of training 
and the relative efficiency of the city's contractors, it does
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not provide insight to the quality, appropriateness or effec 
tiveness of the training.
There are also technical and methodological problems 
with the Dallas training system and with the way information 
is gathered and organized that limit efforts to assess pro 
grams. For example, wage and retention data is not available 
by occupational training area for QIC and the skills 
center—the two largest deliverers of vocational training. For 
these agencies, the information is also not related to the 
characteristics of the clients in the various training areas. A 
second problem relates to the absence of any kind of a con 
trol group for comparing post-program experiences of the 
trainees in the Dallas program. Without comparing the in 
come and employment experience of the clients with their 
counterparts not receiving training, it is impossible to 
measure program effectiveness. Without relating wages at 
placement and retention data to client characteristics and oc 
cupational training areas, it is impossible to make valid com 
parisons among various kinds of training for the different 
client groups served.
Several of the occupational training areas apparently do 
not have quantified training objectives, and, except for 
minimum reading and math skills, clients are not pre-tested 
to determine their knowledge and skills. It is difficult, 
therefore, to objectively evaluate the quality of training in 
the Dallas CETA program.
With these limitations one cannot go beyond making sub 
jective judgments about the apparent quality of the training 
inputs—facilities, equipment, curriculum materials, instruc 
tional staff and length of time a client spends in train 
ing—and related services. A June 1980 on-site review of 
seven of the 13 agencies providing training revealed the 
following:
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• The quality of training and related services provided by 
OHD contractors varies widely.
• The training is short term, providing some enrollees ac 
cess to entry-level jobs that are, for the most part, in the 
secondary labor market.
• With the exception of clerical, auto mechanics and 
nurse's aide, the training areas are far below their goals 
for expenditures, enrollments, positive terminations and 
placements. Pressures on contractors to make their 
goals are adversely affecting the quality of training.
Variations in the quality of training are best illustrated by 
three agencies providing classroom training: the Nurse's 
Aide Academy (NAA), the OIC, and the Dallas Independent 
School District's skill center.
The Nurse's Aide program is the best small training pro 
gram. Through effective outreach, it surmounted problems 
of underenrollment. The five-week program provides 
classroom training in combination with clinical instruction in 
a nearby hospital. The facilities and equipment are modern, 
and the instructors are qualified registered nurses. Instruc 
tional materials are well-written and adapted to the student's 
educational level and procedures and equipment used in the 
training. According to OHD reports, almost 90 percent of 
the trainees were placed in jobs, and about 75 percent were 
still employed a year later. Average hourly wage gains at 
placement were 95 cents—from $2.75 to $3.70 per hour.
In contrast, the OIC program provides open-entry/open- 
exit training in three skill clusters: a computer cluster with 
keypunch and programming, a clerical cluster with clerk- 
typist and secretarial training, and an automotive cluster 
with auto mechanics and body repair. Basic education and 
career development classes are integrated with each skill 
cluster to provide training-related reading and math, GED 
preparation, English as a second language (ESL), consumer
190
education, communications, and orientation to work. The 
average length of stay in training is about 12 weeks.
QIC training is done by qualified and dedicated staff in a 
converted trucking facility with only minimum renovation. 
The staff are partially demoralized by reductions in funding, 
their physical surroundings, and the limitations of the pro 
gram; but they remain committed to providing quality train 
ing for enrollees. Except for the clerical cluster, the classes 
are not full. The center appears to be operating 70 or 80 per 
cent of potential.
The ready availability of jobs requiring no training, low 
training allowances, and minimum levels of support services 
for enrollees all make recruitment and retention difficult. 
Many enrollees will not stay in training long enough to be 
counted as positive terminations. OIC dropouts are averag 
ing more than twice the level expected, while placements are 
at only 53 percent of the goal. In addition to its goal for in 
direct placements, the city required OIC to make an addi 
tional 325 direct placements with no increase in funding. 
OIC soon discovered that few job-ready individuals were to 
be found in the eligible population without a massive recruit 
ment effort, which would detract from its training objec 
tives. OIC probably will meet enrollment goals for the year, 
but not those for positive terminations and placements. 
Average wage gains reported for those employed were 77 
cents from $3.26 to $4.03 per hour.
Although the quality of OIC's training varied, they have 
attracted severely disadvantaged clients and adjusted the 
training curriculums to their educational level. Thus, the 
training is relevant, but its short duration and the lack of 
modern equipment do not equip enrollees to compete effec 
tively for jobs in the primary labor market, though some 
trainees undoubtedly gain access that may allow upward 
mobility over time.
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The Dallas Independent School District's skills 
center—the designated vocational classroom 
facility—provides training and related services in six voca 
tional clusters: clerical; auto paint and body repair; auto 
mechanics; welding; production machine operation; and air 
conditioning, refrigeration, and heating.
The skills center is the best equipped multipurpose training 
program in the CETA delivery system; has qualified staff, 
modern equipment, and well-designed curriculums. 
However, like OIC, it has underenrollment and low place 
ment rates. Through the third quarter of fiscal year 1980, the 
center achieved only 85 percent of its planned enrollments 
because of recruitment problems and high dropout rates. 
Positive terminations and placements are far below expecta 
tions with cumulative placements for the period at 57 percent 
of the goal. Average wage gains at placement were 61 
cents—from $3.36 to $3.97 per hour.
Relatively, the quality of training provided is good. The 
skills center has the potential for an excellent program, but is 
limited by both the city's concern with numbers and low 
average costs and a disadvantaged clientele unprepared for 
more sophisticated training. With the exception of the 
clerical cluster, the center appears to be operating at only 50 
to 60 percent of its potential. No goal except cumulative 
enrollments is likely to be met.
MLK and each of the training deliverers are responsible 
for providing training related services such as intake, assess 
ment, referral, counseling, and support services. However, 
beyond listing the services to be provided in agency con 
tracts, the city has no standard specifications concerning the 
nature and extent of the services. As a result, the amount and 
quality of the services are very uneven. For example, 
counseling services vary from three full-time social workers 
and one employment counselor at the skills center, to infor-
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mal family-style counseling in the nurse's aide program, to 
no services at all at the National Alliance for Business* 
(NAB) on-the-job training program. At NAB there is strong 
emphasis on self-reliance. If situations arise that demand 
counseling, participants are referred to MLK.
Overall quality of training and services a client receives 
depends primarily on the efforts of individual contractors to 
overcome the city's apparent lack of concern and the limita 
tions it imposes on the delivery system. This environment 
pushes community-based organizations without other 
sources of support against the wall. They meet enrollment 
goals, but the quality of instruction suffers. Without outside 
support, they are forced to offer the same or fewer occupa 
tional areas each year. Under the Dallas system, they cannot 
use CETA funds to buy training equipment or renovate 
facilities to expand training. Staff are underpaid, existing 
facilities are inadequate, and equipment needs updating. 
Training in some of these organizations resembles the pover 
ty programs of the 1960s—the commitment is there, but the 
resources are missing. In spite of good attitudes of the staff, 
the environment does not engender feelings in the trainees 
that things are going to get much better. Quality tends to be 
found either in training components with low investment 
costs—basic education, OJT and the nurse's aide pro 
gram—or in programs that are partially subsidized by other 
sources, such as the skills center or QIC's computer cluster 
supported by IBM.
As for the relevance and effectiveness of the training, most 
of the contractors have adjusted their program materials and 
instruction to accommodate the education, skill level and in 
terests of the clients. However, because of the city's interest 
in short term low-cost training, they are unable to spend the 
time required to provide the knowledge and skills in occupa 
tional areas allowing their graduates to compete effectively
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for the semiskilled and skilled jobs available in the Dallas 
labor market. The city's plan for fiscal year 1980 proposed 
that, of the 1,900 to receive classroom training, 800 were to 
be enrolled in occupational areas where the length of training 
is five weeks or less, and only 150 were to receive instruction 
in areas requiring 24 weeks or more. The occupational train 
ing areas funded bore little resemblance to the list of priority 
occupations identified early in the planning process. Of the 
16 top-rated occupations, only two were proposed for fund 
ing; several of the lower-rated occupations were included, 
but the majority of the training was planned for occupations 
not ranked.
Major Influences on Training
The nature and quality of CETA training in Dallas is a 
function of decisions made by the federal government, the 
prime sponsor, and the contractors providing training. 
Responsibility for success or failure, therefore, cannot be 
assigned to any one level of government or single agency; it 
must be shared by all. Under the arrangement there are 
several major factors affecting training programs in Dallas: 
the nature of federal-state-local relationships; city manage 
ment of the program; and the nature of the local delivery 
system.
Federal-State-Local Relations
By design, CETA formalized a new set of intergovernmen 
tal relationships significantly increasing the authority of 
state and local governments to plan and operate programs. 
Although there was a major power shift, the federal govern 
ment retained responsibility for setting broad program ob 
jectives, developing regulations, approving local plans, 
monitoring, and evaluating program performance. There 
are, however, several problems in the CETA version of
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federalism affecting the nature and quality of local training 
programs.
• From the beginning the roles and relationships of the 
major actors—federal, regional, state, and local govern 
ments—were never adequately delineated.
• Legislative amendments and administrative changes 
have kept the delivery system in a constant state of flux.
• The Department of Labor has not maintained a consis 
tent policy framework that sets priorities among pro 
gram goals and establishes the relative importance of 
program effectiveness, administrative efficiency, and 
regulatory compliance.
• With the exception of its emphasis on low-cost 
placements, the Department of Labor focused on 
developing compliance and process-oriented goals, per 
formance criteria, and rewards systems rather than 
output-oriented systems.
• Few prime sponsors had the critical management 
capability to accept the responsibilities and take advan 
tage of the opportunities available under block grant 
funding.
• Before the delivery system was in place, CETA became 
the avenue for massive countercyclical public jobs pro 
grams and a series of new categorical initiatives.
The CETA system is primarily a federal-local one, leaving 
prime sponsors with few incentives for developing working 
arrangements with the states. Managing the CETA program 
in Dallas involves minimal contact with three state agencies: 
the Department of Community Affairs (DCA); the Texas 
Education Agency (TEA); and the Texas Employment Com 
mission (TEC). In each case the relationship is the result of a 
legislative requirement or financial incentive. OHD staff see 
all of the relationships as detracting from, rather than con 
tributing to, quality of local training programs. They must 
be continued to comply with CETA requirements and access
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funds from the state agencies; however, staff feel that the 
less the state agencies and State Manpower Service Council 
know about local programs, the better.
The coordination of CETA with other training and 
employment activities, beyond the legal requirements, has 
not occurred. The state is in a weak position relative to the 
local prime sponsors; the governor's discretionary funds 
have been used largely to fund a variety of special projects; 
and the state agencies operate autonomously, using the 
CETA money they control to their own ends.
The city's relationship with the federal government, par 
ticularly the Employment and Training Administration 
(ETA), is primarily influenced by the ever-changing CETA 
legislation, regulations, and administrative directives for im 
plementing the program. With major system changes in 
1976, 1977, and 1978, program funding became more 
categorical, leaving local prime sponsors with less flexibility 
to design and deliver programs. In an attempt to make the 
new categorical initiatives fit in local CETA systems which 
emphasize horizontal planning and integrated service 
delivery, ETA has issued volumes of regulations and direc 
tives. As a result, the system is currently not being planned 
and managed as originally envisioned. Staff at all levels are 
filling out forms, processing paper, and building 
bureaucratic processes for complying with the latest re 
quirements. The city's current relationship with ETA, 
primarily the regional office in Dallas, revolves around the 
basic information requirements guaranteeing the continued 
flow of federal funds—review of annual plans, periodic 
monitoring visits, frequent special requests for information, 
and the annual assessment of program performance. If the 
Department issues directives that conflict with the local pro 
gram initiatives, OHD fends them off by pointing out con 
tradictions with previous policies or arguing points of pro-
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cess. From experience, they have learned that the first and 
best response to a new directive is to do nothing. More than 
likely the directive will change several times and things will 
end up back where they were in the first place. This ap 
proach, of course, represents dysfunctional behavior in the 
management system, which causes even more directives to be 
issued.
In the regional office, staff members working with the 
CETA prime sponsors feel powerless and frustrated and 
display resignation. They know that the major decisions are 
made elsewhere in the system—in Washington or at the local 
prime sponsor level. In this environment, federal represen 
tatives function as little more than intermediaries who pro 
cess information. For the most part they continue to ac 
quiesce to the program mix determined by local sponsors 
and, therefore, have not bothered to learn much about the 
content of programs. More recently, they have further 
disassociated themselves from the management and program 
decisions made by their own organization, yet they continue 
to exhibit an unfailing commitment—going through the mo 
tions and pushing the paper to comply with the instructions 
from above.
Staff members of the city agency try to help the federal 
representative do his job with a minimum of effort on their 
part. OHD staff and the federal representative have arrived 
at an equilibrium of peaceful coexistence in which they try to 
be accepting and accommodating. Both recognize that they 
spend time on issues of form and process that have no rela 
tionship to program quality. Prime sponsor's plans are 
nothing more than compliance documents, and the annual 
assessment is designed to measure efficiency in terms of costs 
per numbers served, positively terminated, and placed, and 
to document that established systems and procedures are 
consistent with federal requirements. Recognizing the futility 
of these and other similar exercises, the federal represen-
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tative and the prime sponsor's staff work together closely to 
avoid creating any undue problems for each other. Obvious 
ly, both are co-opted in the process and federal management 
of the system breaks down.
City Management of the Program
The City of Dallas did not take advantage of the oppor 
tunities available in the early years of CETA. Apparently, 
program staff were unable: (1) to clearly set program pur 
pose and direction; (2) to develop a rationale for the pro 
gram that was relevant to local conditions, of interest to the 
city council, and acceptable to ETA; (3) to define the ap 
propriate roles and relationships among city officials, staff, 
the advisory committee, and contractors in the decisionmak- 
ing process; and (4) to build a delivery system that satisfied 
existing institutional biases and met local needs. In the 
absence of such a management structure, the city funded ex 
isting community-based organizations to continue providing 
the same kinds of training as that available under the pre- 
CETA categorical programs.
Beginning as early as 1974, there were major changes tak 
ing place in CETA. A series of legislative amendments began 
recategorizing the delivery system and large increases in 
funding for public service jobs and youth made the program 
more complex and more visible to elected officials and the 
general public. Selected cases of poor management, fraud, 
and abuse drew national attention to issues of program 
management throughout the system. In Dallas the increased 
interest in CETA resulted in a change of directors at OHD. 
Under new leadership the office began focusing on develop 
ing efficient systems for securing and disbursing federal 
funds and building administrative procedures and controls 
to satisfy the process-oriented standards set by ETA. Consis 
tent with the conservative values of the local power structure 
and the council, OHD funded short term low-cost training
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programs offering minimum assistance to provide clients ac 
cess to entry level jobs. After that, further progress was up to 
the individual. Administrative efficiency and low-cost train 
ing became top priorities of the agency. Even though the 
1978 CETA amendments further targeted program resources 
on the hard-core unemployed, OHD priorities have not 
changed.
While the emphasis in the Dallas program is a legitimate 
option under CETA, there are several problems with this 
management approach that affect the nature and quality of 
training.
• The CETA program lacks a clear statement of purpose 
and goals. OHD sees itself as an administrative agency 
responsible for writing grant applications, allocating 
funds, managing contracts, staffing advisory commit 
tees, and responding to the city manager and council. 
Beyond administrative efficiency and low cost training, 
the agency apparently has no substantive program mis 
sion—no reason for existence—of its own. Issues of 
quality and effectiveness of training are not high 
priorities at OHD. Moreover, there is no sense of long 
range direction, either in terms of objectives for the pro 
gram or in the design of the local delivery system.
• The responsibilities and relationships among city of 
ficials, OHD staff, the three citizen advisory commit 
tees, and the training contractors remain unclear.
• OHD has developed a number of impressive manage 
ment systems and procedures, but they are not in 
tegrated. Except for the solicitation, review, and selec 
tion of contractors, the various systems do not work 
together. Planned and actual program performance dif 
fer widely. The planning process emphasizes the selec 
tion of efficient contractors, and monitoring and 
evaluation systems stress review of administrative 
capability, fiscal procedures, and program performance
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in terms of numbers enrolled and positive terminations. 
OHD's followup system gathers information on the 
post-program experience of participants; however, these 
systems are not managed to achieve the program objec 
tives as stated in OHD's plan to ETA. Moreover, they 
do not support the development of effective training 
programs.
• Local incentives do not reward time and attention to 
program quality. The efforts of OHD are directed to 
satisfying the city manager and the council; that is, 
keeping the program out of the newspaper and making 
sure the city manager is never surprised. Accuracy is not 
as important as speed, and the quality of the training 
and the nature of the delivery system are not nearly as 
important as producing a high number of low-cost 
enrollments and positive terminations. Through the 
planning and contracting process this emphasis is clearly 
transferred to the delivery system.
• OHD continues to experience high turnover among staff 
and frequent reorganization, which hurt staff morale 
and direct attention away from program issues.
Thus, OHD functions as an administrative clearinghouse 
for federal funds, resembling a local version of the regional 
office. Top management has learned to effectively transfer 
the responsibility for unpopular decisions and management 
or performance problems to citizen's advisory groups, con 
tractors, or ETA. A new level of bureaucracy has been built 
into the delivery system without realizing many of the ex 
pected benefits envisioned by the framers of the original 
CETA.
The Nature of the 
Local Delivery System
Several features of the Dallas delivery system affect train 
ing: the absence of an integrated delivery system; duplication
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of front-end services; the lack of effective working relation 
ships among the contractors; wide variation in the level of 
financial support, skills, and experience among the training 
deliverers; and OHD's overriding concern with inexpensive 
training.
• Apparently, OHD either does not recognize or does not 
understand the interdependence between the city and its 
contractors. Given the decision to contract for service 
delivery, the city's overall performance depends on the 
combined product of its delivery agents. Yet, there 
tends to be a strong "us" and "them" attitude among 
OHD staff. Contractors are given goals and told to 
perform. There is no feeling people are working 
together to produce the desired outcomes, and when 
there are performance problems, OHD does not accept 
responsibility.
• There is duplication of front-end services that creates 
confusion for contractors and an obstacle course for 
program applicants. Most likely because of their in 
creased liability for ineligible participants, the city is at 
tempting to centralize intake, assessment, counseling, 
and referral services through a single contractor—the 
Martin Luther King Center; however, training contrac 
tors are also still required to provide most of these same 
services. MLK staff provide assessment and referral, 
but do only limited testing, and the two employability 
development plans they prepare are not used to guide 
clients through a mix of training and services. Conse 
quently, nearly all of the training contractors test and 
assess clients prior to their enrollment. There is similar 
confusion with outreach and counseling services. Get 
ting into the system is thus a frustrating process involv 
ing a number of referrals back and forth among the con 
tractors. Only those applicants with strong motivation 
and few alternatives are likely to survive the process.
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• There are few effective relationships among training 
deliverers in the system. Because OHD has not built an 
integrated system, linkages facilitating client flow 
among the training agencies are informal and weak. 
This limits movement among contractors, and tends to 
restrict the training options available to the clients.
• There is a wide variation in financial stability, skills, 
and experience among the training deliverers. In its 
quest for inexpensive training, OHD has funded a broad 
range of agencies. Some have a sound financial base 
with support from other sources, while others are 
dependent on CETA funding for survival. Staff salaries 
and the level of management and program skills vary 
widely among the group. OHD has not set minimum 
standards for the quality of training and services to be 
provided. In an effort to get a contract or, later, to meet 
performance goals within cost constraints set by the 
city, training agencies have cut the quality of services 
and the length of training.
• OHD's emphasis on efficiency and low costs precludes 
long term quality training. OHD policy limits the train 
ing contractors* administrative costs to 10 percent of 
their contract. In addition, training allowances are set at 
$2.30 per contact hour—80 cents below the 1980 
minimum wage—and the CETA-funded support ser 
vices system is designed to encourage self-reliance. In 
this environment, most of the training agencies cannot 
afford to offer long term training, and if they did the 
participants most likely to benefit could not afford to 
stay long enough to complete.
Dallas has not taken advantage of its opportunities under 
CETA to develop long term quality training programs for 
the hard-core unemployed because it has no motivation to do 
so. ETA—through grant review, monitoring, and the annual 
assessment—encourages the city to produce as many low-
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cost positive terminations and placements as possible, but 
offers no extrinsic rewards for doing so and levies no 
penalties for failure as long as the city plays the game well 
enough to stay out of the bottom quartile of performers in 
the annual assessment process. None of the quantitative 
measures of program performance relate to content of train 
ing or quality of outcome. This encourages prime sponsors 
and their contractors to play the numbers game.
The city's reward structure reinforces that of ETA. In 
these kinds of systems training programs will be well design 
ed only where exceptional local staff are intrinsically 
motivated to develop and defend such training for the hard 
core unemployed.
Potential for Expanding Training
The management systems at OHD can handle a larger 
training program, but whether the local delivery system can 
do so is a separate question. There are two options for ex 
panding CETA-funded training in Dallas: (1) increasing the 
level of activity with the current contractors, and (2) bring 
ing new deliverers into the system.
The city's major training contractors—QIC and the skills 
center (with the exception of the clerical and auto mechanics 
clusters)—are operating at 70 to 80 percent of their max 
imum enrollments. These existing training areas could be ex 
panded quickly. While these deliverers would tend to offer 
more of the same kinds of training, they would produce 
quick results. For community-based organizations such as 
OIC and SER, expansion would require funding for improv 
ing facilities and updating equipment in addition to the 
amounts normally allowed for training.
The second option is to bring new deliverers into the 
system. Many public and private agencies in the city are anx-
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ious to demonstrate their capabilities to provide quality 
training in a large number of occupational areas. These 
organizations, however, have had little or no experience with 
federal programs or with serving the populations currently 
eligible under CETA. Adding some of these agencies to the 
system would rapidly expand capacity but not output. Prob 
lems associated with administering their first federal grant 
and learning how to deal with CETA clients would adversely 
affect output in the short run.
The issue in Dallas is really more one of the city's response 
to a new training initiative rather than to local capacity. The 
city has repeatedly underspent formula allocations for train 
ing and has chosen not to participate in special initiatives 
such as the Skills Training Improvement Program. Would it 
respond differently to a new training initiative? If it did ac 
cept the funding, it probably would simply fund more of the 
same kinds of short term training currently offered. The 
capacity is there, but the commitment to relevant training for 
the hard-core unemployed should be questioned.
Recommendations
CETA has not evolved into an effective system for manag 
ing federal training and employment initiatives. Currently, 
the delivery system is overburdened with rules, regulations, 
reporting requirements, investigations, and a backlog of 
unresolved audits. There is little evidence that the program is 
being effectively managed at any level. With CETA 
reauthorization on the congressional agenda in 1982, there is 
an opportunity to make changes to improve the quality and 
effectiveness of the program.
• The goals and objectives of training and employment in 
itiatives need to be better focused at the federal level. 
This requires going beyond statements of what is to be 
accomplished to maintaining a consistent policy
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framework for setting priorities among the goals and 
objectives included in the authorizing legislation. 
The intergovernmental delivery system needs to be 
restructured to correct present weaknesses. There are 
several interrelated issues that deserve special attention: 
the state's role, elected official involvement, citizens' in 
put, and determining local service areas.
The State's Role. States do not easily fit in the current 
federal-local structure of the CETA system. In many 
cases, balance of state is an area made up of leftovers 
after all of the local prime sponsor arrangements have 
been negotiated. It's difficult to define local labor 
market areas or to do planning for such areas from the 
state capitol. Program decisionmaking should be decen 
tralized to sub-state planning boards. Another state 
issue has to do with the Governor's discretionary money 
under CETA. Rather than funding special training pro 
jects, this money should be earmarked for investment: 
to develop and demonstrate new programs and to 
enhance the capability of people working in the policy 
area.
Elected Official Involvement. The concept of a single 
entity responsible and accountable for management of 
the local program is valid; however, the decision to 
make state and local governments prime sponsors 
should now be questioned. In most cases, the benefits 
realized—increased political accountability, com 
prehensive planning, program coordination, and in 
tegrated service delivery—do not approach the costs of 
attaching training and employment programs to govern 
ments primarily concerned with fire, police, and capital 
expenditure programs financed from local revenue. 
There is little evidence of local elected officials identify 
ing training programs for the hard-core unemployed as 
high priority on their local agenda. For the most part,
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they have hired staff to run programs designed to shift 
the heat from their office and to keep the peace. Their 
interest in CETA has been limited to the fiscal relief and 
political benefits of the public service jobs program. 
With the 1978 amendments setting average wages and 
stricter eligibility criteria, the attraction to CETA has 
largely disappeared.
Citizens' Input. The three citizens' advisory committees 
now mandated under CETA do not appear to be mak 
ing significant contributions to the quality of local pro 
grams. It's too early to predict the future influence of 
the private industry council, but the other councils ap 
pear to be going through the motions to satisfy federal 
requirements. If local councils are to be a part of the 
system and to be effective, they must be made more 
responsible and accountable for program results.
Determining Local Service Areas. Using the boundaries 
of local political jurisdictions to determine service areas 
and set residency requirements for program participa 
tion runs counter to the concept of labor market plan 
ning. In some cases under CETA, there are five or six 
prime sponsors operating independently in the same 
labor market area.
A possible solution to several of these systems problems 
might be the creation of local labor market boards or com 
missions. These boards—made up of elected officials, local 
citizens, and representatives of business and labor—would 
function as prime sponsors responsible for area-wide labor 
market planning, contracting, monitoring, and evaluation. 
But in contrast to CETA prime sponsors, they would not 
deliver services. The board's labor market planning respon 
sibility would include looking at the participation of all the 
supply-demand institutions in the area. Funding available to 
the board would be used at the margin to fill identified gaps
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and complement labor market services provided by the 
myriad of other federal, state, and local organizations.
• The roles and relationships among the major actors in 
the delivery system must be clearly delineated. It is not 
enough to identify the primary recipients of funding, or 
to say that all levels in the system are responsible for 
monitoring and evaluation. Each level in the manage 
ment hierarchy must have well defined limits of authori 
ty and responsibility. Once established, these basic rela 
tionships must be maintained over time to reduce the 
confusion and uncertainty in the system.
• Incentives—rewards and punishment—must be built in 
to the system to achieve the stated goals. Under CETA 
the rhetoric encourages one set of responses; however, 
performance measures, assessment criteria, and incen 
tives reward different behaviors.
• Major attention must be given to developing the 
capabilities of people working in the delivery system. 
Few people in the system demonstrate the knowledge of 
the policy area and the management skills to successful 
ly implement programs. In a decentralized delivery 
system, the commitment and competence of the deci- 
sionmakers ultimately determine the nature of the quali 
ty of the service provided.
